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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 195. TERM
In the case of In Re Jones' Wil, 64 the court followed the gen-
eral rule and held that where a will gives a trustee full power and
authority at any time to sell the trust realty the will should be
construed by the court as giving the trustee an unrestricted power
of sale which survives the trust. It was pointed out however, that
when the trust terminated, the trustees could not exclude the
remaindermen from managing the property or performing acts
of administration in respect thereto, including collection of rents.
In the instant case the contention of the trustee was that he
had the power to manage and control the trust property, to the
exclusion of the remaindermen, pending final accounting and dis-
charge by the court. The court approved this contention where
personal property is concerned, 5 but stated that where real prop-
erty is involved the title immediately vests in the remaindermen
upon expiration of the trust" hence the remaindermen have com-
plete power of control over the property.
Construction of Testamentary Grants
Among the many rules available to the courts for use in the
construction of grants of property are: (1) the presumption of
early vesting of interests, with its ancillary rule favoring early
indefeasibility of vested interests;' (2) the preference for the
blood line of the grantor;18 (3) the rule that a devise of an abso-
lute interest will not be deemed to be cut down by later language
in the instrument unless such language is clear and unambigu-
ous.69 The application of these rules is supposedly for the purpose
of ascertaining the intent of the grantor where the language of
the grant is not clear.70 The courts are, however, in search of
their own version of the intent (what has been described as "judic-
ially ascertained intent' 7 1 ), which may actually differ from the
actual intent and even from what the court believes to be the
actual intent.72
64. 306 N.Y. 197, 117 N. E. 2d 250 (1954).
65. Where personal property belonging to a terminated trust is involved the rule
is that the duty remains with the trustee to divide the personalty and to distribute it,
and the trust is not complete until the trustee has finally accounted, distributed the
property to the person entitled to it and been discharged. See Matter of Millers' Will,
257 N.Y. 349, 355, 178 N.E. 555, 556 (1931) ; Neary v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co.,
260 App. Div. 791, 24 N.Y. S. 2d 264 (2d Dep't 1940).
66. See REAL PpoPERT LAW § 109; Watkins v. Reynolds, 123 N.Y. 211, 25 N.E.
322 (1890) ; Towunshend v. Frommer, 125 N.Y. 446, 26 N.E. 805 (1891).
67. Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N.Y. 406, 60 N.E. 20 (1901).
68. Matter of Rooker's Will, 248 N.Y. 361, 162 N.E. 283 (1928).
69. Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 99 N.E. 2d 222 (1951).
70. Close v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 195 N.Y. 92, 87 N.E. 1005 (1901).
71. RIESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 241 (2).
72. See Matter of Watson's Will, 262 N.Y. 284, 299, 186 N. E, 787, 791 (1933).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In a recent case,73 a will before the Court of Appoals for
construction provided for a trust for the lives of the sister and
cousin of the testatrix, the corpus to go to her nephew on the
termination of the trust, but in the eveht the nephew predeceased
the sister and the cousin the corpus was to go to charity. The
nephew outlived the cousin but predeceased the sister. The court,
bolstering its opinion with the rules mentioned above, construed
the will literally holding that the nephew's interest vested inde-
feasibly on his surviving the cousin. The remainder passed to his
estate, therefore, and the gift to the charity was defeated.
Judge Van Voorhis, the sole dissenter, maintained that the
intent of the testatrix that the nephew survive the termination of
the trust in order to take was manifest, and that in view of this
intent the rules of construction should not be applied.
Judicial Correction of Invalid Trust Provisions
It is the established rule in this state that invalid portions
of a will may be excised by the court so that the remaining provi-
sions may be preserved and the intent of the testator carried out
as far as possible. 4 The proper application of this rule was the
issue before the Court of Appeals in In re Fischer's Will. 75
In this case the testator had provided for the creation of a
trust, the income to be paid to his wife for her life and upon her
death the principal to become a part of his residuary estate. A
further provision set up a trust of the residuary estate, which
was to be charged with an annuity to be paid to the testator's
mother for her life, the balance to be held until his grandson be-
came twenty-one, or if he should die before reaching that age until
the grandnephew of the testator should die or reach twenty-one.
On the termination of the trust the corpus was to be distributed
to residuary legatees named in the will. The Surrogate ruled that
the trust set up for the widow violated the rule against perpetui-
ties since the corpus might not be alienable until the testator's
wife, grandson and grandnephew had died. In order to effectuate
the intent of the testator as far as possible, the Surrogate pre-
served the trust for the widow by deleting the third measuring
life insofar as it applied to the corpus of the widow's trust. He
further determined that (since the remainder interests of the
residuary legatees were contingent and, therefore, not subject to
acceleration 7 ) the residue of the corpus of the widow's trust
118
73. In re Campbell's Will, 307 N.Y. 29, 119 N.E. 2d 577 (1954).
74. Kalish v. Kalish, 166 N.Y. 368, 59 N.E. 917 (1901).
75. 307 N.Y. 149, 120 N.E. 2d 688 (1954).
76. Matter of Durand, 250 N.Y. 45, 164 N. E. 737 (1928).
